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I. INTRODUCTION AND ROADMAP

A little over a decade ago, a state-of-the-art one-gigabyte disk drive
cost nearly $ 1000.' In November 2008, a Seagate 750 gigabyte drive could
be purchased from an Internet retailer for around $140.2 Organizations
have leveraged advances in storage technology to house enormous
amounts of data which, in turn, provide a treasure trove of discoverable
information to an adverse party. Whether the attorney is providing or
requesting data during discovery, he may not sufficiently understand 3 the
technical architecture supporting the information central to the case. Thus,
in the age of electronic discovery (e-Discovery) and complex, massive
data stores, law firms and corporations alike need a new skill set-what
the author terms the Information Technologist-Attorney (IT-Attorney)-to
direct legal e-Discovery requests and oversee an electronic document
strategy. The IT-Attorney would be conversant in both the law and in core
Information Technology (IT) data storage methodologies and processes,
and very well may have had a prior IT career. The position could more
than offset its cost in sanction control, directed cost-shifting, and improved
case management. Most importantly, the heightened legal duties placed
upon counsel to locate and preserve information, and the extreme
consequences for breaching those duties, mandate the technical vigilance
of an IT-Attorney.
Part II of this Article looks briefly at the 2006 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure related to e-Discovery and the current
body of law from the oft-cited Zubulake rulings. Part III examines the ITAttorney's role in managing sanctions and penalties flowing from
discovery orders of electronic data. Part IV looks at how the IT-Attorney

1. Marc Spiwak, Review: Seagate Packs 750 Gbytes Into a Single Hard-DiskDrive, INFo.
=
193100232.
2. Buy.corn, http://www.buy.com (enter "seagate internal 3.5 750" into search box, then
select "search" button).
3. Douglas W. Kim, E-Discovery: A PracticalApproach, SCITECH LAwYER, Fall 2007, at
7 (finding that legal professionals generally have education and experience that focus on
humanities, as opposed to a technical discipline); Dawn M. Bergin, How Will Lawyers FareIn the
New World of E-Discovery? PRAC. LITIGATOR, Mar. 2007, at 25 ("The legal profession is still
chock-full of liberal arts major and is not yet dominated by members of generations X or Y, who
grew up operating complex electronic devices with ease and as second nature.").
WK., Sept. 25,2006, http://www. informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml;?articleID
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can improve overall case management through directed cost-shifting,
driving the discovery process and ensuring that electronic communications
remain privileged. Part V concludes by summarizing the arguments
supporting recruitment for the in-house IT-Attorney skill set.
II. E-DIscovERY LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. The Zubulake Rulings
In Zubulake v. UBS WarburgL.L.C.,4 a U.S. district court in New York
rendered a number of rulings related to the discovery of electronic
information in an employment discrimination case. Judge Shira
Sheindlin's rulings comprise some of the most often cited in the area of eDiscovery, and were made prior to the 2006 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Grappling with the application of the thencurrent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2) to limit scope or shift
costs for a massive e-Discovery request, Judge Scheindlin drew a bright
line between "accessible" and "inaccessible" data in Zubulake 1.6 Judge
Scheindlin categorized different types of data storage and their respective
positions relative to her bright line.7 Judge Scheindlin then modified a
prior standard8 to create a new seven-factor test for use in the cost-shifting
analysis when seeking inaccessible electronic data.9 The distinction
between accessible and inaccessible data and the interplay of the seven
factors are discussed at length later when this Article examines the ITAttorney's role in cost-shifting.' 1
In Zubulake V, data responsive to the discovery order was lost, even
after inside and outside counsel "repeatedly advised UBS of its discovery
obligations."" The Zubulake V court chided counsel for its failure to
oversee UBS's discovery process in its duty to both locate and preserve

4. 382 F. Supp. 2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V);
220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake IV); 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake III);
217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I).
5. Bergin, supra note 3, at 27.
6. Zubulake1, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
7. Id. at 318-20.
8. Rowe Entr't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421,429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
9. ZubulakeI, 217 F.R.D. at 322-23.
10. See infra Part IV.A-B.
11. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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responsive information. 2 The court stated that counsel must take
affirmative steps and be actively involved in the discovery process, and in
so doing, "must become fully familiar with her client's document retention
policies, as well as the client's data retention architecture.' ' 13 The court
took a rather expansive view of the attorneys' responsibilities, which
include interviewing information technology employees and key litigation
players; searching data for text matches; re-issuing the litigation hold and
reminding key players periodically; and ensuring employees produce and
secure relevant active files. 4 The Zubulake V court imposed sanctions on
the defendant, which included an adverse jury instruction to permit the
jurors to
infer that the missing "evidence would have been unfavorable to
15
UBS

B. 2006 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure
The September 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure introduced provisions to support the discovery of electronic
information.' 6 An IT background would be helpful to interpret and apply
most of the amendments; in particular, Rules 26(b) (discovery scope and
limits), 26(f) (parties' planning for discovery), and 37(f) (safe harbor) 7
require an in-depth technical understanding of the underlying information
architecture.
Rule 26(b) specifies discovery scope and limits. Under certain
conditions, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) limits discovery for data "not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost."' 8 As discussed later, the
terminology "not reasonably accessible" has proven a vexing concept for
courts grappling with the intersection of law and information technology.
Discovery can be further limited under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) when, among
other things, "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 432.
Id.at 432-34.
Id. at 440.

16. See ADMINISTRATivE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EDiscoveryw_

Notes.pdf.
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f), FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); see also
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 16.

18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

THE GENESIS OF THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIST-A TTORNEY

the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues."' 9
The comments to Rule 26(b)(2) allow for the shifting of costs to the
requesting party for "not reasonably accessible" data, in certain
situations.20
Rule 26(f) was amended to "direct the parties to discuss discovery of
electronically stored information during their discovery-planning
conference.",2' The Committee Note emphasizes the importance of the
discovery plan to preserve and identify electronic data, and points out that
"[i]n appropriate cases identification of, and early discovery from,
individuals with special knowledge of a party's computer systems may be
helpful."22
Rule 37(f) exempts from sanctions a party who does not satisfy
discovery requests when the data loss is due to the "routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system., 23 For example, regularly
scheduled purging or recycling of backup media would not subject the
party to liability prior to notice of litigation. 2 Naturally, once a party gains
notice of possible or pending litigation, he must take measures to preserve
data (the "litigation hold") and would be liable for data loss resulting from
routine purge activities.25
C. Zubulake after the FederalRules Amendments
Even after the enactment of the 2006 Amendments to the Federal
Rules, the Zubulake rulings appear to remain good law, according to the
Sedona Conference Working Group, an assemblage of attorneys, jurists,
and other professionals experienced in e-Discovery matters.26 Published
in June 2007, the second edition of The Sedona Principlesposits that the
amendments to the Federal Rules-of which the Conference played a
"pivotal" role-still do not answer some of the most "vexing questions

19. Id. R. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
20. Id. R. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
21. Id. R. 26(o advisory committee's note.
22. Id.
23. FED. R. Clv. P. 37(f) advisory committee's note.
24. Id. ("absent exceptional circumstances, sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of
electronically stored information resulting from the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system.").
25. Id.
26. SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION AND
PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION, SECOND EDITION i, iv (The Sedona

Conference Working Group Series, 2007) [hereinafter SEDONA PRINCIPLES].
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judges and litigants face" in the area of e-Discovery. 27 Although the
Sedona Principlesand other authorities often cite the Zubulake line of
cases, Zubulake was decided by a New York federal district court, and
therefore offers only persuasive value to other jurisdictions.28 Other
jurisdictions have fashioned their own rules, 29 and most states are still
developing rules and procedures for dealing with e-Discovery. ° Thus, the
Federal Rules Amendments and Zubulake provide a starting point for an
evolving area of law.
Il. THE ROLE OF THE IT-ATTORNEY TO CONTROL
SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES

A. The Expansive Duties to Prevent/MitigateSpoliation
Under the expansive list of responsibilities laid out by the Zubulake
rulings, counsel must traverse a minefield of duties with data-intensive eDiscovery cases. Here, the defensive IT-Attorney would fill a critical harddollar role by leveraging his IT background to ensure compliance and
avoid sanctions and penalties. Indeed, current thinking advises in-house
and outside counsel to create a discovery response team tasked with
"creating, reviewing, modifying, and implementing policies and
procedures for [electronically stored information] production for the
organization."'" Whether in-house or outside, counsel will be attached at
the hip with the IT department as part of the Discovery Response Team.32
Because, pursuant to Zubulake, counsel is expected to take an active,
affirmative role to ensure compliance with discovery orders, counsel must
fundamentally understand the architecture and technical processes, or face
potential breaches of duties."3 The IT-Attorney's skill set is not merely
recommended, it is nearly required under Zubulake.
A supreme example of sanctions occurred in Coleman v. Morgan
Stanley when a judge granted a motion for default judgment against
27. Id. at iv.
28. See generally SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 26; ARKFELD, infra note 39.
29. See Analog Devices, Inc. v. Michalski, No. 01-CVS-10614, 2006 WL 3287382 (N.C.
Super. Ct. 2006) (analyzing multiple approaches to cost-shifting, but choosing the approach of a
district court in Maryland over Zubulake).
30. SEDONA PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, at 5.
31. Kim, supra note 3, at 10.
32. Id.
33. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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Morgan Stanley for egregious failures to deliver electronic data during
discovery.34 A Morgan Stanley IT Executive certified that he had turned
over all relevant e-mails requested during discovery.35 However, two
weeks prior to the certification, Morgan Stanley employees uncovered an
additional 1600 backup tapes in a closet, which had not been searched at
the time the certification was signed.3 6 Due to the false certification,
spoliation of evidence and numerous other missteps, the judge granted an
adverse inference order that ultimately led to a $1.57 billion jury verdict
against Morgan Stanley. 7
The author proposes that the IT-Attorney's technical credibility will
advance the disposition of his duties during discovery. As an IT-savvy
professional, the IT-Attorney is more likely to be perceived as an insider
to the IT department rather than a technically-challenged, "meddling"
lawyer. The IT-Attorney's legal knowledge would have also played a key
role for Morgan Stanley where the IT Executive misinterpreted the
certification order to not include the newly recovered backups.38 The
author suggests that the IT Executive's mistaken belief that the
certification order did not apply to newly discovered tapes was a legal
question, not a technology question. The author postulates that, operating
in separate spheres, the IT Executive was unaware of the legal implications
of the newly located tapes, while counsel, outside the loop, was
uninformed of developing IT operations. The confluence of the ITAttorney's legal and IT training, coupled with his integration into the
internal ITdepartment-and a resource to the signing executive-might
have halted the submission of a false certification. In Morgan Stanley, the
IT-Attorney would have been in a key position to take active measures to
deal with the newly discovered tapes, such as promptly notifying inside
and opposing counsel and moving the task to the top of the priority list.
Although Judge Maass cited a litany of e-Discovery procedural lapses,
Morgan Stanley's failure to timely notify opposing counsel and to take
reasonable measures to search the newly discovered backup tapes factored
heavily into her decision to issue a default judgment.39
34. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005
WL 674885, at *9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (currently on appeal).
35. Susanne Craig, Age ofDiscovery: How Morgan Stanley BotchedaBig Caseby Fumbling
Emails; In Puelman Suite, Judge Says Firm Acted in "Bad Faith,"It Blames Honest Errors;A
Trove of Tapes in Brooklyn, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May 16, 2005 (URL no longer available).
36. Id.
37. Id.See also Craig, supra note 35.
38. Craig, supra note 35.
39. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005
WL 4947328, at 32 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan
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B. Counsel's Obligation to Ensure ComprehensiveSearches
Although counsel in Zubulake Vescaped sanctions, counsel was found
to have "failed to properly oversee UBS" in the duty to locate, preserve,
and timely produce information.' Zubulake V assigned the duty and
attributed the failure to both outside and inside counsel.4' Yet the duties
articulated in the Zubulake rulings are not an all-inclusive list.
Counsel's duties also encompass the duty to search, as evidenced in
Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Resources Corp.42 In Phoenix Four, a
contract dispute arose between the parties.43 Strategic Resources (SRC)
ceased operations shortly thereafter, and moved out of its offices." Around
ten computer workstations were left behind, later discarded by the
landlord.45 SRC defendants retained "two servers and at least two
computer workstations." Mound Cotton (counsel to SRC) advised
defendants to gather relevant documents, both paper and electronic.47
SRC searched the defendant's workstation, but not the servers.48 During
a service call, a technician discovered data in a "dormant, partitioned
' The defendant's workstation "did not have a 'drive
section of the server."49
mapping' to that partitioned section of the hard drive. ' 50
The Phoenix Four court held that counsel failed in its obligation to
locate and produce evidence from the server, noting that "counsel's
obligation is not confined to a request for documents; the duty is to search
for sources of information."'" The Phoenix Four court felt that Mound
Cotton's cursory inquiry fell far short of the methodical survey outlined
under Zubulake V. The Phoenix Fourcourt explained that Mound Cotton

Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885, at *6-*9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005).
When deciding whether to levy default judgment or dismissal, courts will look at whether "(1)
defendant acted willfully or in bad faith, (2) plaintiffs were prejudiced by defendant's actions, and
(3) alternative sanctions would fail to adequately punish defendant and deter future discovery
violations." MICHAELR. ARKFELD, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE § 7.09 [K] [d][iv] (2004
ed.).
40. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Zubulake V).
41. Id.
42. No. 05 Civ. 4837 (HB), 2006 WL 1409413, at *5-*6 (S.D.N.Y. 2 006).
43. Id. at *1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *2.
47. Phoenix Four, 2006 WL 1409413, at *2.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *5 (emphasis in original).
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should have investigated further about the discarded computers, which
would have led them to the existence of the server under question.52
Furthermore, counsel should have "direct[ed] that a technician examine the
server" if the defendants could not adequately explain whether information
was stored on the server.53 The judge emphasized "that the duty in such
cases is not to retrieve information from a difficult-to-access source, such
as the server here, but rather to ascertain whether any information is stored
there."54
The technology half of the IT-Attorney is trained to trace the lineage
of computer systems and identify the functions and resource usage of each.
By diagramming the systems, the IT professional would be unable to
reconcile the data accounting in Phoenix Four and would investigate
further. This methodical approach increases the likelihood that the ITAttorney, acting either in an offensive or defensive situation, would have
located the previously ignored sources. The outside technician in Phoenix
Four might have spotted the hidden partition because he performed his
own form of data accounting and determined that no users were mapped
to it. Whatever the technician's methodology, the errant mapping was
easily spotted by an outsider with presumably no extant knowledge of the
systems' history. These types of technical forensic skills are likely outside
the province of most mainstream attorneys.
Although Morgan Stanley, mentioned earlier, was decided on
spoliation of evidence rather than a failure to locate, improperly written
scripts and software errors also factored into the judge's decision to order
a default judgment.55 Arguably, the duty to locate may extend to
formulating queries and search criteria against identified discoverable
sources.
Collecting data is an iterative process. The end user must have a
comprehensive understanding of the software's operation and often must
experiment with complex queries to achieve the desired hit. As discussed
later,56 Westlaw-like searches familiar to legal professionals are not
necessarily supported by discovery software tools. The query writer must
fully comprehend the discovery order and connect its free-form legalese
into an unforgiving programming code. If responsive data is not returned
because of an over-restrictive or incomplete query, it follows that the party

52. Phoenix Four,2006 WL 1409413, at *6.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 AI, 2005
WL 674885, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
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has failed to locate evidence, similar to the PhoenixFour omission of the
unmapped partition. Accordingly, neither an attorney nor an IT
professional is perfectly suited to formulate the searches; rather, it requires
the metamorphosis of the two disciplines.
Ensuring comprehensive and accurate searches extends beyond use of
a discovery search tool; it includes understanding the complex databases,
application systems, and proliferating hardware that run the organization.
Corporations are often the result of multiple mergers or acquisitions of
predecessor companies with duplicate IT applications. Over time, IT
systems are consolidated, and historical information can be lost in the
process. Imagine, for example, that a corporation purchases a company
that supplies products to an outside dealer network. The larger corporation
also maintains relationships with the same dealer network. Over time the
databases and systems of the parent and newly-acquired subsidiary are
consolidated, as are some of the offices of the parent and subsidiary. The
dealer network becomes involved in litigation with the parent and requests
sales data before and after the acquisition to demonstrate a drop of
business in breach of contract. The non-IT-Attorney might unwittingly
accept the report generated off of the new database that confirms the
plaintiff's accusations. The IT-Attorney, however, would request the
schemas (definitions of data fields) and transformation algorithms of the
pre- and post-consolidation databases to determine whether the
hypothetical company complied with its contractual obligations. In this
example, the IT-Attorney ensured not only a comprehensive search, but
also an accurate compilation of the data. Opposing counsel must have the
same technical understanding to ensure that they are not victims of the
incompetence or trickery of the producing party.
The IT-Attorney also provides a valuable audit function, both as an
offensive and defensive resource. Imagine another hypothetical where the
requesting-party IT-Attorney is incredulous of his opponent's inability to
find responsive e-mails. He asks opposing counsel to produce the search
strategy used, including the mined sources. The IT-Attorney discovers that
his opponent failed to search the local mail archives (known as ".pst" files
in Microsoft Exchange) for the subject litigants and did not include
common misspellings for textual searches. Such a discovery, after
depositions have been taken, could result in sanctions and a new round of
depositions, as in Phoenix Four.57 Discovery of responsive e-mails at a

57. Phoenix Four,2006 WL 1409413 at *6,*9.
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later stage of litigation could result in an adverse inference instruction or
default judgment.5"
The Phoenix Four characterization of the unmapped drive as "legacy
data that remains from obsolete systems and is unintelligible on the
successor systems" and thus, "fits squarely" within the definition of a
"difficult-to-access source" under Rule 26(b)(2), 59 presents additional
opportunities for debate. An unmapped drive is easily remedied with only
a few mouse-clicks. 6' The depiction of legacy data by the judge in Phoenix
Four is not consistent with industry-accepted principles. 61 Legacy data
refers to a data storage format used by a predecessor system (e.g., Oracle
Database version 6) that cannot be read by the current system (e.g., Oracle
Database version 10), not to an unmapped drive.62 Educating and
persuading the judge that the source is readily accessible might have
worked to the benefit of Phoenix Four in its request for a stiffer sanction.
Clearly, the IT-Attorney's understanding of IT terms and processes
enables him to effectively argue the accessibility issue on either side of the
line that supports his client's position.
Finally, the IT-Attorney, whether in-house or outside counsel, is a
resource that would reduce the workload on both the IT and legal
departments. Most IT organizations are already overstretched. 63 Discovery
requests may interfere with important strategic projects and be demoted in
priority. In Morgan Stanley, discovery efforts languished after a change in
command within the IT department.' The new leader did not find out
about the subject litigation until five months after taking command, and,
even then, only gave the project "somewhat greater priority. 6 5 Judge
Maass reprimanded Morgan Stanley for not considering the use of outside
58. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley, 2005 WL 674885, at *9.
59. 2006 WL1409413 at n.7 (internal citations omitted).
60. On the opposite side of the litigation, the IT-educated attorney might posit that the data
remained inaccessible without the expensive and difficult "restoration" services of the outside
technician. As stated above, and contrary to the ruling in PhoenixFour,the more credible argument
seems to be that the unmapped drive was accessible and easily searched. See Mapping a Network
Drive, http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp.using/networking/maintain/mapdrive.mspx
(instructions on how to map a drive in Windows XP).
61. For definitions of legacy data, systems and applications, see Legacy Application
Software, http:I/www. bitpipe.com/tlistlLegacy-Applications-Software.html (last visited Aug. 11,
2008).
62. Id.
63. Sarah Michaels Montgomery, E-Discovery:Aligning Practicewith Principles,SCITECH
LAW., Fall 2007, at 13.
64. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005
WL 4947328, at 10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005).
65. Id.
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contractors to expedite the process." The author concludes that because
the IT-Attorney is on the hook for meeting court deadlines and maintains
ownership of the tools and access to the data, discovery requests will not
be neglected somewhere in an overworked IT department. Furthermore,
merging technical and legal skills into a single person may save costs and
streamline decision making compared to the management-by-committee
structure of multi-discipline teams.
To recap, the author suggests that the IT-Attorney fulfills a critical role
by understanding and querying the IT infrastructure, correctly formulating
search criteria, and interpreting the data in satisfaction of the duty to
locate. The IT-Attorney will have detailed knowledge of the progress of
discovery orders and may offload work from the IT department. The ITAttorney also shapes the judge's understanding on the accessibility of data
in order to force inclusion or exclusion of sources under Federal Rule
26(b)(2). The IT-Attorney's powerhouse of IT and legal knowledge is
essential to formulating both offensive and defensive e-Discovery tactics,
including audit of opposing counsel. While larger corporations with
regular discovery requests could easily justify the in-house IT-Attorney,
law firms present an even more compelling case for the skill set. As seen
in Phoenix Four, many clients may be small entities-possibly
bankrupt-without any IT department, and the technical expertise for eDiscovery requests must come from outside counsel.

IV. THE IT-ATTORNEY'S SKILL SET ENSURES
SUCCESSFUL E-DISCOVERY CASE MANAGEMENT
A. DirectedCost-shifting I.- The Definition of "Accessible" Turns on
Counsel's Persuasion
As mentioned previously, the Federal Rules allow for the shifting of
costs to the requesting party in cases where the data is "not reasonably
accessible."67 Even though the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules
were not in place at the time of Zubulake I, Judge Scheindlin made an
admirable attempt to translate the technicalities ofelectronically accessible
information into the reasonableness standards familiar to the legal
profession. Judge Scheindlin's translation algorithm relied on the
underlying storage medium as the primary basis to determine

66. Id.

67.

FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(C) advisory committee note.
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accessibility.68 Accessible data is "readily usable," and does not require
restoration or manipulation to be usable.6 9 Inaccessible data is "not readily
usable," and requires some type of manipulation (restoring backups,
reconstructing hard-drives).7 ° Accessible data consists of active, online
data, near-line data, and offline storage/archives, while backup tapes and
erased, fragmented, or damaged data constitute inaccessible.7' As will be
discussed,72 the complex and ever-changing storage technology landscape
offers a fertile playground for the IT-educated attorney to challenge the
Zubulake classification scheme and its conclusions. Furthermore, although
the bright line of Zubulake might mitigate the need for judicial
interpretation in some cases, the "reasonably accessible" wording of the
current Rule 26(b)(2) invites it. Even though Zubulake is still frequently
cited,73 it was decided before the enactment of the 2006 Amendments to
the Federal Rules. The time may be ripe for a new set of decisions that
directly apply the amended Federal Rules.
Recall that the Phoenix Four74 court characterized the unmapped drive
as a "difficult-to-access" source.75 Although Phoenix Four evaluated
sanctions instead of performing a cost-shifting analysis, its accessibility
determination was in error (in the author's opinion) under most analyses,
including Zubulake.76 Zubulake I classifies hard drives that are "active,
online data," as the most accessible.77 The drive in Phoenix Four was
uncompromised, waiting to be examined, either through the simple
creation of a drive mapping or via a local search.7 8 Had PhoenixFourbeen
a cost-shifting scenario, the requesting-party IT-Attorney could have
corrected the judge's misunderstanding of the information's accessibility
and averted the shifting of costs to his client.
The data categorization scheme of Zubulake I is particularly
problematic as one gets close to the line between accessible and

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Zubulake 1,217 F.R.D. 309, 318-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id.at 318-20.
See infra text accompanying notes 86.

73. See generally SEDONA PRINcIPLEs, supra note 26 (searching the document for

"Zubulake" returns 48 references).
74. See supra Part III.B.
75. Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837(HB), 2006 WL 1409413,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006).
76. The author's conclusion was drawn from the limited description of the IT infrastructure
and underlying problems as contained in the Phoenix Four opinion. See id.at *1-2.
77. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I).
78. 2006 WL 1409413, at *6.
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inaccessible data. Category number three, "offline storage/archives," is on
the accessible side of the line, and consists of "removable optical disk or
magnetic tape media.... "79 Category four, backup tapes, also typically
magnetic tape media, is on the inaccessible side of the line."0
Categories three (offline storage/archives) and four (backup tapes) both
contain magnetic tape and backups-often with similar accessibility
challenges and cost-but are inexplicably on different sides of the
accessibility line.8 ' Further confounding Zubulake I's categorization
scheme is the juxtaposition of optical disk and magnetic tape in category
three,8 2deemed accessible, which have access speeds ranging from hours to
days.
Finally, relying on a now-defunct vender web site, Zubulake I lapses
in credibility by incorrectly classifying JBOD ("Just a Bunch of Disks")
as offline data, 3 when, in fact, it is probably best described as active,
online data. 84 JBOD may be a sloppy mechanism for arranging disk farms,
but it consists of hard drives and is easily searched.8 ' The distinction may
seem like petty technical minutiae to the IT-outsider, given that categories
three and one are both considered accessible under Zubulake 86 However,
placing JBOD into category three places it close to the line between
accessible and inaccessible data, when it is properly viewed as one of the
most accessible forms of media. Thus, in ajurisdiction developing its own
multi-factor test, an IT-Attorney might save the day for his client by

79. 217 F.R.D. at 319.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See JBOD Definition, PC Magazine, http://www.pemag.com/encyclopediaterm/0,2542,t
%253DJBOD%2526i%253D45599,00.asp (defining JBOD as "A Group of hard disks in a
computer that are not set up as any type of RAID configuration."); see also Planning the disk
configuration, Microsoft TechNet, http:/ technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cclI 1569.aspx.
To decide on the configuration for the disks, consider the relative importance of
capacity, cost reliability, and performance in your environment. For example,
because JBOD does not consume disk space for storing parity data, a JBOD
configuration makes maximum use of storage capacity. For the same reason, the
reliability of JBOD configurations is poor; a single disk failure inevitably results
in data loss.
Id.
85. Id.
86. 217 F.R.D. at 319.
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educating the judge who otherwise might misclassify the information's
accessibility to the client's disadvantage.
With a multidiscipline background, the IT-Attorney is also in a position
to clarify current doctrine or shape a new paradigm for a cost-shifting
analysis. Eventually, evolving technologies will likely render the Zubulake
classifications obsolete. Imagine an immense, thousands-of-petabytes"7
data warehouse that becomes the source of complex discovery. Imagine
further that the discovery order requires multiple full-pass searches. Under
Zubulake, active, online data is an accessible format."8 However, under our
hypothetical circumstances, the producing party might need to procure
multiple super-computers and may require vast amounts of time to satisfy
the order, supporting an argument that the data is inaccessible. Recall that
Zubulake I drew the accessibility line based upon whether the information
was in a "readily usable format," meaning that "the data does not need to
be restored or otherwise manipulated to be usable." 9 Here in our
hypothetical situation, the IT-Attorney's knowledge of technology and the
law would be central to educating the judge on the true accessibility of the
information. As an additional example, online encrypted data requires
varying degrees of difficulty to decrypt and is not directly addressed by
Zubulake or the Federal Rules.9" Alternatively, advances in backup
software and hardware may transform recovery from backup tapes from
inaccessible into accessible data.
Peskoff v. Faber demonstrates the difficulty courts have when they
evaluate whether cost-shifting is appropriate and what constitutes
accessible information under the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules.9'
In Peskoff, the defendant was ordered to produce e-mails from several
sources, including the "slack space" from the plaintiff's computer.92 The
defendant supplied a copy of the disk drive, but declined to pay for the
cost of the forensic expert necessary to search it.93 The judge rejected the
cost-shifting request, reasoning that the newly-enacted amendments to the
Federal Rules relieve the producing party only with regards to inaccessible

87. Big Storage on the Cheap, http://news.cnet.com/Big-Storage-on-the-cheap/2100-1015_35808754.html. One terabyte consists of 1000 gigabytes; 1000 terabytes equals one petabyte. Id
88. 217 F.R.D. at 319.
89. Id. at 319-20.
90. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg L.L.C., 382 F. Supp. 2d 536 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); 229 F.R.D. 422 (Zubulake V); 220 F.R.D. 212 (Zubulake IV); 216 F.R.D. 280 (Zubulake
III); 217 F.R.D. 309 (Zubulake I).
91. 240 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 2007).
92. Id. at 28-29, 31.
93. Id. at 29-30.
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data.94 The Peskoff judge further explained, "[t]he obvious negative
corollary of this rule is that accessible data must be produced at the cost
of the producing party; cost-shifting does not even become a possibility
' Yet the Federal Rules
unless there is first a showing of inaccessibility."95
limit discovery for information "not reasonably accessible," and
specifically do not use the terms "accessible" and "inaccessible." 96 The
advisory committee note to the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules
states that "[i]t is not possible to define in a rule the different types of
technological features that may affect the burdens and costs of accessing
electronically stored information."97 Arguably, the 2006 Federal Rules are
not inconsistent with Zubulake III's wording that leaves the door open for
cost-shifting when seeking accessible data.98 Thus, the determination of
reasonably accessible is left to judges who may rely on Zubulake or rulings
made by other courts.
What is particularly mystifying about the Peskoff decision is its
conclusion that the slack space of the disk drive qualified as accessible
data.9 9 Peskoffoffers no explanation for its determination of accessibility,
citing neither the Federal Rules nor precedent such as Zubulake.'0°
Zubulake I unequivocally classified the slack space of a disk drive as
inaccessible, falling into the category of "erased, damaged, or fragmented
data. 1 °1 Under Zubulake I, the Peskoff drive should have been classified
as an inaccessible source, and, thus, eligible for consideration of costshifting. Accordingly, an IT-Attorney working for the defense might have
successfully shifted some of the costs back to the plaintiff by educating the
judge on the Zubulake 1inaccessible data definitions. An IT-Attorney, with
his technical expertise, is in a position to reshape the local definitions and
tests used in the cost-shifting analysis.
In sum, by leveraging experience, knowledge of storage systems and
developing technology, the IT-Attorney is uniquely qualified to clarify
technical issues for the judge on the side of accessibility that is most

94. Id. at 31.
95. Id.
96. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B)-(C), FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
97. Id.
98. "It is worth emphasizing again that cost-shifting is potentially appropriate only when
inaccessible data is sought. When a discovery request seeks accessible data ... it is typically
inappropriate to consider cost-shifting." Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(emphasis added to "potentially" and "typically").
99. Peskoff, 240 F.R.D. at 30-31.
100. Id.
101. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I).
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favorable to the client. Defining and identifying accessibility appears to be
both a developing and malleable point of law.
B. Cost-shifting II: Counsel Must Argue the Zubulake Seven Factor
Test--Or Fashiona New One
After determining that data is "not reasonably accessible," the next
hurdle in the cost-shifting analysis is to apply the Zubulake seven-factor
test. "2 An IT-Attorney's expertise would enable him to argue the technical
aspects of the free-form test in his client's favor:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in
controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available
to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control cost and its incentive
to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information."3
The Zubulake I court admonished a mechanicall °4 application of the test,
and advised use of the test as a guide towards answering "the central
question.., does the request impose an 'undue burden or expense' on the
responding party?"'0 5 The test is drawn from text contained in both the preand post-2006 Federal Rules. 0 6 The Zubulake I court assigned the greatest
level of importance to the first two factors, referring to them collectively
as the marginal utility test. 0 7 Factors three, four, and five comprise the
second group, and address cost issues. 0 8 Factor six "stands alone" and
tends to come into play on rare occasions involving a novel or "broad
public impact" issue, but could predominate over other factors.' 0 9 The last

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.at 322-23.
Id.at 322.
Id.at 323.
Id.at 322 (quoting FED. R.Civ. P. 26(b)(iii)).
FED. R.CIv. P.26(b)(2)(C); FED.R.Civ. P.26(b)(iii)).
Zubulake1, 217 F.R.D. at 323.
Id.
Id.at321,323.
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factor, number seven, is assigned the least importance since discovery
requests normally benefit the requesting party."n0 Factor seven may weigh
against cost-shifting in "unusual" cases where the responding party
benefits from the production of data."' Some of the factors turn not only
on questions of law, but also on the capabilities of the underlying
technology." 2 Judge Scheindlin applied the seven factor analysis in
Zubulake III and ultimately shifted twenty-five percent to the plaintiff,
Zubulake." 3 However, the decision to shift costs was not a slam dunk, as
various factors weighed in favor of cost-shifting, while others weighed
against it." 4
The "marginal utility" factors, numbers one and two, focus on the
likelihood of obtaining relevant information from the inaccessible
source." 5 Here, the requesting-party IT-Attorney must understand the
backup scheme and zero in on responsive sources. In Zubulake I,the judge
ordered the defendant to produce and search five backup tapes selected by
the plaintiff in a sampling scheme. "6 In Zubulake III, the judge determined
that the plaintiff's discovery request was narrowly tailored because it
produced responsive e-mails." Additionally, backup tapes were the only
means of restoration." 8 The judge concluded that the marginal utility of
restoration would be potentially high, and therefore, the first two factors
tipped "slightly against cost-shifting."" 9 Clearly, a miscalculation in the
selection of backup tapes could have affected the entire viability of the
plaintiff's case. The correct choice of backup tapes turned on a thorough
technical understanding of backup procedures and the20 underlying
architecture that met counsel's targeted discovery requests. 1
The cost calculation factors also beckon the skills of an IT-trained
attorney. In Zubulake III, the court concluded that while the costs of a full
restoration of backup tapes were substantial, they were smaller than the
amount in controversy, and thus, weighed against cost-shifting. 2 '
Presumably, inflating the costs of restoration increases the chances of

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.at323.
Id.
Id. at 324.
Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 284-91.
Zubulake 1,217 F.R.D. at 323.
Id.at324.
Zubulake 11, 216 F.R.D. at 287.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 286-87.
Id.at288.
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shifting costs to the requesting party; disproving the alleged costs and
presenting less expensive alternatives (e.g. outside vendors) resists costshifting. Both attorneys to the litigation must have a thorough
understanding of IT industry procedures and cost models if they wish to
drive the analysis in favor of their respective clients.
Finally, moving to factor seven, "the relative benefits to the parties of
obtaining the information," there is an interesting paradox and opportunity
to shape the law.' 22 Recall that the seventh factor is the "least important,"
because most discovery requests will benefit the requesting party,123 and
costs are normally borne by the producing party. 2 4 In Zubulake III, the
first four factors tipped against cost-shifting, factors five and six were
neutral, and the final factor, the least important, favored cost-shifting.'25
Appearing to defy its own rules, the court still shifted twenty-five percent
of the costs to Zubulake, the requesting party.'2 6 Thus, despite the court's
disclaimer, factor seven appears to carry significant weight. Here, the ITAttorney's understanding of the underlying data may help to spin the
relative benefits argument to the client's favor. As discussed earlier, the
consolidation of legacy information systems sometimes results in
confusing interpretations of the underlying data.'2 7 The producing-party
IT-Attorney can advance a cost-shifting argument by effectively
explaining the origins and meanings of the data and why it has no value to
either party. Presumably, the producing party would want to avoid the
argument that the data has great value to requesting parting, even if such
an argument advances cost-shifting to the requestor. Likewise, the same
technical understanding of the underlying data would be instrumental to
the requesting party in its attempt to stave off cost-shifting.
Finally, the entire Zubulake seven-factor test presents an enormous
opportunity for the IT-Attorney to flex his hybrid muscles to shape a
developing area of the law. Although Zubulake is extensively cited, it is
the non-binding decision of a New York federal district court. Other
federal circuits and state courts may wish to design their own standards in
the evolving area of e-Discovery. Indeed, the "gold standard" prior to
Zubulake was the Rowe eight-factor test.'28 Zubulake determined that the

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

216 F.R.D. at 289.
Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. 280, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 320.
Zubulake 11, 216 F.R.D. at 289.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
ZubulakeI,217 F.R.D. at 320.
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Rowe test was incomplete and fashioned its own seven-factor test."' The
IT-Attorney's comprehensive understanding of evolving technologies puts
him in the best position not only to drive the cost-shifting analysis on
individual cases, but also to shape the next set of tests in his local
jurisdiction.
C. An IT-Attorney is in the Best Position to Drive the Discovery Process
Under Federal Rule 26(f), counsel for the plaintiff and defendant are
chartered with mutually agreeing on a discovery plan. 3 ° The IT-Attorney
is central to leading the discovery process, rather than being led by an
aggressive opponent, or having the terms dictated by a judge. In Williams
v. Taser International,the judge, fed up with the parties' inability to
cooperate, imposed twenty-one specific search terms on the defendant.' 3
The judge, presumably familiar with Westlaw- and Lexis-type searches,
mandated searches that required word combinations within the same
sentence or within a certain number of words. 3 2 At least two popular
discovery products do not support these Westlaw-like searches.' 33
the Taser-imposed "'pre-existing' within 10 words of
Scanning for
'condition"" 3 " would require a search for the presence of both words, and
a manual review for the proximity search. In the case of an enormous email system, the IT department may have to develop custom programs to
effectuate the proximity search. An IT-Attorney would have been critical
to imparting the discovery tools' capabilities to the judge, in the absence
of taking an IT specialist with him to each hearing.
For the plaintiff, the IT-Attorney would exercise control over the case
through multiple tactics. By presenting exacting, efficient searches, the ITAttorney presumably would quash objections of overbreadth and check
shifting of costs to his client. Additionally, the IT-Attorney can leverage
knowledge of the limitations and weaknesses of the IT infrastructure
against his opponent or prevent exploitation of his client. In sum, the IT-

129. Id. at 321-22.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(2).
131. Williams v. Taser Int'l, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-0051-RWS, 2007 WL 1630875, at *5 (N.D.
Ga. June 4, 2007).
132. Id. (e.g., "'pre-existing' within 10 words of 'condition').
133. Symantec.com, Symantec Enterprise Vault, http://www.symantec.com/business/
products/overview.jsp?pcid=2244&pvid=322_1 (last visited Aug. 11,2008); Sherpa.com, Sherpa
Discovery Attender, http://www.sherpasoftware.com/rnicrosoft-exchange-products/discoveryattender.shtml (last visited Aug; 11, 2008) (new releases of these software products containing
additional features may have been issued since the time of this writing).
134. Williams, 2007 WL 1630875, at *5.
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Attorney's knowledge of search technologies would put him in control of
the e-Discovery process, permitting him to better limit (or expand) the
universe of discoverable data and audit his opponent.
D. ProtectPrivilegedInformation:
The IT-Attorney Minimizes Nonlawyer Contactwith
Electronic Documents
Previously, the author argued that the iterative nature of discovery tools
poses challenges when complying with the duty to locate.13 5 Query results
have to be reviewed for accuracy. Some large organizations have IT staff
exclusively dedicated to litigation searches.136 If IT personnel execute and
refine the queries, they are potentially reviewing highly sensitive and
privileged information. E-Discovery software often flags search hits with
the sentence containing the offending phrase. Would the IT professional's
knowledge of privileged communications be discoverable? If the answer
is yes, then the formulation and execution of discovery queries should be
removed to the legal department, under the direction of the privilege
protected and technology savvy IT-Attorney. This section will examine the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine under federal and
Arizona law.
According to American Jurisprudence:
The attorney-client privilege extends to clerks employed by an
attorney in the business committed to his or her charge.
Statutes in some jurisdictions make privileged certain
communications disclosed to an attorney's stenographer, clerk, or
other employee; however, even where a statute expressly extends
the attorney-client privilege to communications with an attorney's
clerk, secretary, or stenographer, the communication is not
necessarily privileged, as where the communication was not made
with any reasonable expectation that it would be confidential, nor
for the purpose of securing legal advice or assistance.
The attorney-client privilege applies with equal force to
paralegals. 37
'
135. See supra Part Ill.B; see also supra text accompanying notes 131-34.
136. Interview with Mark Olsen, Director of Controls and Governance, (technology-related
company), in Tempe, Ariz. (Oct. 26, 2007).
137. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 400 (2007).
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The author could not locate case law addressing whether the IT employee
who writes e-Discovery queries would be treated in the same way as an
attorney's clerk or administrative assistant. The comments to the
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers include "computer operators" in
the list of nonlawyer staff to whom an attorney may disclose privileged
information. 38 Arguably, the IT technician, working under the direction
of an attorney, could be the attorney's employee. The discussion begins by
looking at the corporate context where in-house IT staff is commissioned
to locate e-mails matching the specified search criteria. The IT staff may
also be responsible for the first level check for core responsiveness of the
identified data.
In the corporate setting, attorney-client privilege originally covered
only the "corporate control group," which is defined as the "top echelon
of decisionmakers within the corporation.' ' 139 The Upjohn Co. v. United
States court extended the privileged communications to lower level
employees who were interviewed by corporate counsel as part of an
ongoing internal investigation. 4 ' However, our hypothetical IT staff is not
a participant in the underlying litigation-they are merely data locaters for
the attorneys. Would the IT staff's knowledge of privileged
communications be discoverable or protected by attorney-client privilege?
It seems to be a lengthy stretch to infer that courts would view IT staffers
running search queries to be factually analogous to the Upjohn
subordinates who may "embroil the corporation in serious legal
difficulties."''
Turning to Arizona, there the supreme court discarded the control
group test and created its own version of the Upjohn formula in Samaritan
Foundation v. Goodfarb.'42 In Samaritan,a child died during surgery.'4 3
The hospital's counsel had a nurse paralegal interview assisting surgery
staff.1" While the Samaritancourt held that confidential communications
initiated by the employee seeking advice from corporate counsel were
privileged, it also held that,

138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. g (2000).

139. Alexander C. Black, What Corporate Communications are Entitled to Attorney-Client
Privilege-ModernCases, 27 A.L.R. 5TH 76 § 2 (1995).
140. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394-95(1981).
141. Id. at 391.
142. 862 P.2d 870, 872-73 (Ariz. 1993).
143. Id. at 873.
144. Id.
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where an investigation is initiated by the corporation, factual
communications from corporate employees to corporate counsel are
within the corporation's privilege only if they concern the
employee's own conduct within the scope of his or her employment
and are made to assist counsel in assessing or responding to the
legal consequences of that conduct for the corporate client.'45
The Samaritan court reasoned that the determination should be based on
the "nature ofthe communication and not the communicator."'" The court
further explained that the "privilege does not apply to corporate-initiated
factual communications from those who, but for their status as employees,
are mere witnesses."' 47 Applying its rule, the court concluded that the
statements of the assisting surgery staff were not in the pursuit of legal
advice, and therefore, were not covered by attorney-client privilege.'48 The
court noted that counsel initiated the contact with the surgery staff who
were witnesses to the incident.' 49
Although the Arizona legislature later supplanted Samaritan with a
statute providing wide-reaching corporate attorney-client privilege in civil
actions, 150 arguably, the case suggests that the IT staffer who locates emails on behalf of counsel may not be protected by the privilege. Under
Samaritan, when counsel makes the overture to IT personnel, the
employee could be viewed as a non-party witness to the privileged
communications contained in e-mails. The IT staffer did not seek, nor did
counsel offer, legal advice. The IT staffer typically has no connection to
the underlying controversy for which he is locating e-mails. On the other
hand, the IT staffer is acting at the behest of corporate counsel and is,
arguably, a temporary member of the legal department. The determination
might turn on which department funds the activity or to whom the IT
staffer reports. Although Arizona's statute favors the protection of
privilege for organizations in civil actions, other jurisdictions may provide
ample room for persuasion in either direction.
The work-product doctrine presents a different set of challenges. Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a qualified work-product immunity

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 872-73 (emphasis added).
Id. at 874.
Samaritan,862 P.2d at 874.
Id. at 880.

149. Id.

150. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (2008).
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may apply to "documents and [t]angible [t]hings" prepared in the course
or anticipation of litigation.15 ' E-mails fall under this umbrella.'52
In FlashmarkTechnologies LLC v. Gtech Corp., the defendant argued
that the qualified privilege of Federal Rule 26(b)(3) did not apply to
documents (including e-mails) "created by or for non-attorneys."' 53 The
court reviewed the documents in camera and determined that they were
not proven to have been "transmitted between an attorney and a client for
the purpose of securing legal advice," however, they were "at least created
by a named plaintiff to the suit."' 54 The Flashmarkcourt held that the
attorney-client privilege did not protect the documents, but the workproduct doctrine did.'55
The Flashmarkcourt reasoned that the documents fit within the "clear
language" of Rule 26(b)(3), which applies the work-product doctrine to
documents prepared "'by or for another party or by or for that party's
representative. ' ' ' 1 6 The work-product privilege is qualified under the
Federal Rules; work product may be discoverable "only upon a showing
that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means."' 57 Even then, discovery is limited to "'factual' or 'non-opinion'
work product and requires a court to 'protect against the disclosure of the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative. ',18 Presumably, information assembled by the IT
technician for counsel would fall under the work-product doctrine, to the
extent the information contained privileged communications. Naturally,
non-privileged factual e-mails relevant to ongoing litigation would likely
be discoverable.
While some written and electronic documents might be protected by
the work-product doctrine, other types of communications (e.g. oral) may
not be. The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure share the same "documents

151. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A); In re Echostar Commc'n Corp. 448 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
152. Echostar,448 F.3d at 1301.
153. Flashmark Tech. LLC v. Gtech Corp., Civ. No. 2:06-CV-205, 2007 WL 2264765, at *3
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2007).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting FED. R. Cir. P. 26(b)(3)(A)).
157. Flashmark,2007 WL 2264765 at *2 (quoting FED. R. Civ.P. 26(b)(3)).
158. In re Echostar Commc'n Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting FED. R.
Cw. P. 26(b)(3)).
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and tangible things" language of the Federal Rule.'5 9 Likewise, Arizona
strives to "maintain substantial uniformity between the State and Federal
Rules. 16° In Emergency Care Dynamics, Ltd. v. Superior Court, the
Arizona Supreme Court held that counsel communications with a
consultant who doubles as an expert witness do not fall under the workproduct doctrine. 16 ' The court adopted the rule that "[a]n expert may be
either a witness or a protected consultant, but not both.' ' 162 But, which
communications with the non-testifying consultant are protected? The
court noted that the applicable Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure "does not
expressly address whether such discovery may extend to the expert's
communications with counsel.' 16' The issue before the Arizona court did
not require it to decide whether only "documents and tangible things" were
protected with respect to non-testifying experts. 6" Federal courts have
come to completely opposite conclusions as to whether the work-product
doctrine extends beyond documents and tangible things. 65 Clearly, this
area of the law is unsettled.
Although IT personnel are usually deployed in response to anticipated
or active litigation, it is unclear whether their knowledge of privileged
communications, obtained by cultivating e-mails, would be discoverable.
Furthermore, although IT personnel are presumably honorable
professionals, they are not trained in legal matters, and may inadvertently
compromise sensitive or privileged information. Removing the function
of e-mail collection to the legal department better ensures that the
communications remain privileged. On the flipside, the legal staff may not
be sufficiently conversant in IT technologies to properly operate the
discovery tools without oversight of the IT-Attorney. Hence, the IT skills
required to discover electronic information, and the legal skills needed to
protect privileged information, further demand the dual-discipline ITAttorney.

159. ARiZ. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(3).
160. Id.
161. Id. at298.
162. Id. at 301.
163. Id. at 299.
164. Emergency Care Dynamics, Ltd. v. Superior court, 932 P.2d 297, 298 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1997) (Fidel, J., presiding).
165. CompareIn re Echostar Commc'n Corp. 448 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("Unlike
the attorney-client privilege, which protects all communication whether written or oral, workproduct immunity protects documents and tangible things, such as memorandums, letters and emails."), with Elm Grove Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 480 F.3d 278,303
(4th Cir. 2007) ("Any such draft reports or attorney communications made or provided to nontestifying or consulting experts should be entitled to protection under the work product doctrine.").
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E. The IT-Attorney is Best Equipped to Audit Document Management
and ComplianceEfforts
Within the corporate setting, the IT-Attorney is likely the most
qualified to manage the intersection of both the legal and technical
requirements of an electronic document management policy. Under the
"safe harbor" provision of Federal Rule 37(f), sanctions are excused for a
party unable to provide electronic information lost as a result of "the66
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system."'
While the rule does not permit an organization to exploit the operation to
"thwart discovery obligations,"' 67 it does create a strong incentive for
organizations to implement purging mechanisms in order to limit the
universe of discoverable information for unforeseen future litigation.
Identifying which items to purge and which to keep is both a technical and
legal question. Purging decisions must be based on a thorough technical
understanding of the characteristics of the storage media, the type of data
being stored, the ability to retrieve the data, and the difficulty of
implementing a litigation hold (should one be required), coupled with a
legal understanding of the applicable requirements for which types of data
must be maintained and for how long. For example, one organization
wrestled with the enablement of a phone feature which allowed an e-mail
to be generated with a voice message attachment (e.g., ".wav" file)
because this type
of file is not readily searchable by current software
6
technologies.1 1
One must also have a thorough understanding of the morass of statutes
and regulations in order to establish an electronic document strategy.
Many rules are specific to a particular industry. One of the many failures
on the part of Morgan Stanley 69 was the company's overwriting of e-mails
after one year, in direct violation of an SEC rule requiring retention in a
"readily accessible form for two years."' 70 A closer look at the subject SEC
regulation reveals numerous retention rules, with different retention
periods based on record type, among other things.' A glance at other

166. FED. R. CIv.P. 37(f) advisory committee's note.
167. Id.
168. Interview with Mark Olsen, supra note 136.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
170. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 Al, 2005
WL 4947328, at 2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) (citing 1997 version of 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4). The version
of 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 in effect in 2007 uses the language "easily accessible." 17 C.F.R. §
240.17a-4(b) (2007).
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4 (2007).
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federal regulations reveals a variety of retention requirements: three years
for employer payroll records,172 but only two years for "[s]upplementary
basic records"; 73 five years for "service and compensation" records related
to railroad retirement pensions; 74 and thirty years for medical records of
employees exposed to toxic substances. 175 An attorney could be employed
full time to sift through the myriad regulations to ensure that his client
keeps just enough data, but not too much. Furthermore, the IT-trained
attorney is invited-if not required-to revisit the quagmire of the
accessibility issue; as some SEC regulations require the records to be
"easily accessible,"' 76 other regulations stipulate "readily accessible,' 77
and most simply specify "accessible.' ' 78 Also, as previously discussed at
length, the cost-shifting analysis turns on the accessibility of the data, and
may create an incentive to make certain types of data more difficult to
access.179
Corporations typically have many compliance initiatives afoot besides
those related to e-Discovery. For example, although a discussion of
Sarbanes-Oxley is beyond the scope ofthis Article, the legislation contains
broad requirements for companies to ensure the integrity of "internal
controls" of financial systems. 8 ' Internal controls naturally involve the
entity's information technology systems. Many software vendors offer
solutions targeted towards "SOX" compliance, as it is known in the
industry. 8 ' In some cases, the fit between the vendor's solution and the
statutory requirements is tenuous. Accordingly, a technical understanding
of software solutions and legal understanding of compliance requirements
demands the mated knowledge of IT and law, and provides another
justification for the IT-Attorney.

172. 29 C.F.R. § 516.5(a) (2007).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 516.6(a) (2007).
174. 20 C.F.R. § 210.7(g) (2007).
175. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020(d)(2)(ii) (2007).
176. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-4(b) (2007).
177. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 4290.600(c) (2007) ("[R]ecords must be preserved for the periods
specified in this paragraph (c) and must remain readily accessible for the first two years of the
preservation period.") (emphasis added).
178. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 516.7(a) (2007).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 67-101.
180. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. Res. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002) (enacted).
181. See, e.g., QUEST SOFrWARE, INC., TECHNICAL BRIEF: QUEST PRODUCTS HELP ACHIEVE
SARBANES-OXLEY COMPLIANCE (2005), http://www.quest.com/QuestSiteAssets/Documents/
wmimport/SarbanesOxleyCompliance 20050329.pdf (exemplifying a software vendor's pitch on
how its solutions ensure compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley).
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V. CONCLUSION

Given the pace of technological change, imagine the capacity of a disk
drive that can be purchased ten years from now for the present equivalent
of $140. The amount of data that will be stored by businesses promises to
be enormous, even by today's standards. Masses of discoverable electronic
data may be a cornerstone of most litigation, not limited merely to
corporations with sizable IT shops. Effective litigation often requires the
fusion of an information technologist and an attorney, especially during
discovery when cases can be won or lost independent of the merits. The
blended skills of the IT-Attorney are critical to driving sanctions, costshifting, and case management in the malleable area of electronic
discovery law. Consolidating technical and legal skills into one person
saves the costs of multidiscipline teams and facilitates nimble
decisionmaking. The professional advocated in this Article is a specialist,
but the future may involve evolution for most attorneys into a "light"
version of the IT-Attorney. Evolving electronic discovery law has
bestowed attorneys with additional duties under threat of sanctions and
liability. Although previous generations of attorneys primarily concerned
themselves with the content of discoverable information, attorneys now
must fundamentally understand the mechanics of the information or face
the prospect of malpractice.

